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1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter we argue, first,  that the way in which Central and 'East' European 
countries (CEECs) integrate into the wider European economy will have important effects 
on the long-term growth of the EU and CEE. Their integration through production 
networks, formed within intra- and extra-MNCs linkages, is an essential part of the wider 
European integration, which includes market as well as institutional or policy integration. 
Second, the micro-level integration of the wider Europe is neither automatic nor without 
its problems. The depth of industrial integration is not the automatic outcome of the depth 
of institutional (policy) integration. The issue of compatibility between policy/institutional 
and micro-level integration has to be explicitly addressed as their mutual interaction will 
determine the emerging industrial architecture of the wider Europe and thus the growth 
prospects for Europe. 
   Pan-European integration started in the period characterised by trade liberalization 
and the expansion of international financial markets. These processes are described in 
UNCTAD (1994, p. 118) as shallow international integration, meaning the spread of market 
linkages through greater trade and factor flows, and government action to reduce obstacles 
to these flows. The processes of financial and trade globalization are closely linked to the 
process of producing goods and services, i.e. to micro/enterprise level globalization.  
Globalization today is distinctive as a micro-phenomenon that enables production 
integration and networking and, as such, creates a deep international integration at firm 
level. Integration at micro level, or the level of international production, goes beyond arm's 
length market exchanges by internalizing cross-border exchanges under the common 
governance of TNCs or through different forms of sourcing or network relationships.  
Interlinkages between macro (shallow) and micro (deep) globalization processes 
produce a specific economic and technological dynamic of globalization (Radosevic, 1999). 
Interlinking produces an unbalanced but increasing integration of some geographic areas or 
dimensions (competition, production, demand, finance) of the world economy, while 
simultaneously producing divergence or marginalization of others.  3 
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Although market integration is a necessary objective of enlargement, it is in no way 
a sufficient condition of dynamically efficient outcomes for an enlarged EU. Convergence 
of the CEECs in terms of growth is much more likely if market integration  between the 
existing EU and the CEECs is reinforced by production and technology integration. 
Otherwise, the CEECs could end up being integrated into the EU, but being isolated and 
marginalised in terms of production and technology linkages and excessively dependent on 
budgetary transfers. A proper understanding of the conditions for 'deep integration' 
demands a better understanding of supply-side phenomena and, in particular, of the extent, 
factors and nature of production and technology linkages between the existing EU and the 
CEECs. 
The specificity of EU integration, when compared to other regional integrations in 
the world, is the strong policy and institutional integration. The integration process is top-
driven and aims at 'deep' institutional integration.  However, the viability of political and 
institutional integration of the wider Europe cannot be separated from the breadth and 
depth of integration at firm-level. Policy (macro) and production (micro) integrations are 
driven by different forces and have certain degrees of autonomy, i.e. they can be developed 
independently of each other. However, in the long-term they should be compatible and 
reinforce each other. If the disparity between depth and breadth of micro/production and 
macro/institutional integration becomes too great this will increase both economic and 
political costs for the EU and the accession countries and could undermine the 
enlargement raising diverse security concerns.  
The need to ensure compatibility between policy and production integration and 
thus reduce the social costs of their incompatibility raises a whole set of new policy and 
management issues: Will the compatibility between these two levels of integration emerge 
automatically? Is the policy of integration sustainable if micro-links are weak?  Is the policy 
of integration necessary at all for micro-integration? 
The analysis of these issues should shed new light on the potential and 
sustainability of 'deep'  integration within the wider Europe. It could also provide a basis 
for evaluating the current EU policy towards the Central and 'East' European countries 
which so far have had neither coherence nor any overarching strategy (Wallace, 1997). 
Against this background the chapter tries to set out the main issues that the 
problem of (in)compatibility between micro/production and macro/institutional 4 
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integration of the wider Europe raises. The chapter is predominantly of an exploratory 
character. In particular, it tries to set the framework for research on how are the ''East'' - 
'West' industrial networks shaped by the policy integration processes. Section 2 defines the 
problem of ‘East ‘ - ‘West’ industrial networks within the growth or 
convergence/divergence perspective. In section 3 we place the discussion more specifically 
into the context of industrial upgrading. In section 4 we elaborate the conceptual and 
research framework within which issues of industrial integration of the wider Europe could 
be researched further. We approach the problem by using the alignment of networks 
framework (Kim and von Tunzelmann, 1998) and apply it to central and east European 
situation. Section 5 provides conclusions. 
 
2. Convergence and divergence in the wider Europe and industrial networks: what 
CEE brings? 
 
The extent and nature of the linkages that emerge between the 'East' and 'West' of 
Europe will strongly shape the competitive dynamics and industrial development in CEE 
but also in the EU. The accession of the CEECs into the EU raises the issue of whether  
'East' - 'West' industrial networks will be a factor in improving the growth prospects of the 
enlarged EU or whether they will deepen the differences in levels of development and 
undermine prospects for more balanced growth.   
The role of  international industrial networks in growth and industrial upgrading of 
the wider Europe require some understanding about what CEE brings to European 
industry and economy. With the enlargement, the heterogeneity of the EU in terms of 
output will increase.  In general, the enlargement will lead to a lowering of the GDP/per 
capita. Even the most developed CEE countries, like Czech R, Hungary, Poland, and 
Slovakia,  are below EU 'South' countries in terms of GDP per capita.  In this respect, the 
enlargement would lead to more heterogeneity in the EU. Also, in terms of trade 
competitiveness, other things being equal,  the enlargement would lead to weakened trade 
balance and export competitiveness of the EU. As a counter to this, the variations in cost 
variables, like wages, productivity levels, and labour unit costs, have also increased in 
Europe and are now approaching the range of Asian economies (Landesmann, 1999, p.5). 5 
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However, the enlargement would increase the coherence of the EU economy in 
terms of economic (Mickiewicz and Bell, 2000; EBRD, 1999), and industrial (Urban, 
1999) structures, and R&D (Radosevic and Auriol, 1998)
1. CEECs are  in an intermediate 
position between the EU 'North' and the EU 'South' in terms of industrial structure (eg, 
shares of labour-intensive and sophisticated engineering industries - see Urban, 1999). In 
terms of industrial specialisation, CEECs and the EU less favoured countries are not 
targeting the same sectors. In this respect, they will not compete against each other but 
could be complementary. As Weber and Soete (1999) point out, 'the specialisation profiles 
of first-round Eastern European enlargement countries and the main EU countries with 
less favoured regions indicate that this (competition) is generally not the case, with the 
exception of transport equipment' (p. 8). 
As a result of this intermediate position of CEE the opportunities for intra-industry 
trade and intra-industry production networks between the EU 'North' and the future EU 
''East'' are possibly greater than with the current EU 'South' countries. Heterogeneity in 
terms of outputs, but increasing homogeneity in terms of structure and inputs, suggest that 
the prospects for EU enlargement may be much better than is commonly supposed. 
Significant cost differentials make opportunities for further expanding intra-industry trade 
and production networks more attractive. 
Driven largely by integration into the supply chains of major European industrial 
firms, the economies of CEE are already showing signs of convergence to the industrial 
specialisation profiles of the 'Northern' EU countries (OECD, 1998). This comes through 
an increase in FDI in CEECs but also through complementary networks of non-equity 
links. Contrary to initial expectations, there has been no significant diversion of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) from the 'EU South' to the CEECs (Brenton et al, 1998). 
Nevertheless, countries like Hungary and the Czech Republic seem to be already equally 
well, if not better, integrated into global production networks than some regions in the 
current EU (Weber and Soete, 1999). 
So far, the increased heterogeneity in levels of development of a would-be enlarged 
EU has been perceived as a problem. However, based on the 'East' Asian experience 
Zysman and Schwartz (1998) argue that the 'heterogeneity of production functions' (p. 17) 
                                                                   
1 According to EBRD (1999) in the more advanced central European countries, industrial employment as a share 
of the total had stabilised by the mid-1990s at a level above that in comparable market economies (p. 89). 6 
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within the wider Europe may offer a solution. ''East'' - ''West'' industrial networks could 
operate as a mechanism for industrial upgrading. Increased differences in levels of 
development are interpreted by Zysman et al (1997) not as a liability, but as an asset. The 
advantages of divergence come from the opportunity to separate product development 
from production and radically minimize the capital requirements and the range of in-house 
production skills needed for volume production and mass strategies (Zysman et al, 1997, 
1998).   
Inspired to a great extent by the phenomenon of 'East' Asian cross national 
production networks Zysman et al (1997) have posed the question of whether 'East' - 
'West' European production integration, if based on cross national production networks 
(CNPNs), would represent a potential growth opportunity, not only for CEE but also for 
the developed EU economies. CNPNs are defined as 'relationships among firms that 
organise, across national borders, research and development activities, procurement, 
distribution , production definition and design, manufacturing and support services in a 
given industry (Ernst, 1995a cited in Zysman et al, 1997, p. 57). 
Within the traditional view, due to differences in wage and development levels, this 
relationship would be defined based on relative comparative advantages and would be 
confined to trade. However, the opportunity of merging countries with such a different 
'production functions' would generate, through CNPNs, technological dynamism. As 
Zysman et al (1997)  point out  '(i)nstead of essentially labour intensive low or middle skill 
products in a mature or at least declining sector, we are talking about production 
arrangements in the core elements of the industrial economy, consumer durables, and in 
the most rapidly expanding set of sector, electronics' (p. 59). 
Many of Zysman et al (1997) conclusions are useful in generating hypotheses and 
in defining research agenda but they cannot be taken for granted. The reason for this is that 
opportunities arising from differences between CEE and EU as regions may be undermined 
by several following factors:   
First, differences between European 'East' and 'West' are similar to east Asian 
differences in terms of output (GDPpc, wages, export unit prices, productivity). However, 
differences in terms of economic and industry structure and inputs (skills, R&D) have 
actually made Europe more homogenous. Whether this is a favorable basis or not for 
CNPNs is not yet clear. 7 
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Second, the process of European integration and enlargement is also shaped by 
political integration. As Zysman and Schwartz (1998) point out legal restrictions on labour 
reorganisation and layoffs deter European companies from expanding these production 
arrangements (p. 13). The institutional convergence and legal harmonisation is certainly 
not favorable to production arrangements that rest on technological and institutional 
diversity. 
Third, economic conditions in Europe have not been so far conducive to rapid 
internationalisation of production by EU firms, thereby slowing their expansion into 
foreign locations (Linden, 1998, p. 4). 
Finally, Zysman and Schwartz (1998) point out that the European MNCs have, to 
date, been slow to explore the new strategies or exploit the possibilities of these cross-
national contract production arrangements due to their specific features. They had limited 
production involvement in Asia and Asian production networks and hence little experience 
in cross national production networks. Also, they seem to be organised as closed networks 
which hinders the development of contract manufacturing
2.  
 
3. International industrial networks and industrial upgrading: conceptual issues and 
research 
 
The issue that underlies the research questions introduced in section 1 is that of 
trade- or FDI-based industrial upgrading of CEE as well as of the EU. More specifically, 
the issue is under what conditions can policy, trade and production- based integration 
become a vehicle for industrial upgrading. As Ernst (1999, p. 32) points out 'the dynamic 
coupling of domestic and international knowledge linkages is of critical importance for 
economic growth in a globalizing world'. Growth is dependent on the way countries 
integrate into the global economy. This results from national factors but also from the 
strategies of foreign enterprises. An understanding of these issues is essential for 
understanding the prospects for catching up in a globalised world economy. The emerging 
                                                                   
2 While the first argument is valid, the second is probably a generalisation that may not reflect the tendency. The 
research by Tulder (1998) on strategies of EU companies in the CEE car industry shows that in fact the majority of 
them operate as open networks. 8 
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policy issue is under what conditions can international linkages be leveraged as carriers for 
an industrial upgrading of  CEE and EU?  
The importance of this issues comes from the fact that participation in global 
commodity chains is a necessary step for industrial upgrading because it puts firms and 
economies on a 'potentially dynamic learning curve' (Gereffi, 1999, p. 39) or generates 
'dynamic learning' (Radosevic, 1999). As Ernst (1999, p. 1) points out '(i)nternational 
linkages can recharge domestic knowledge creation, provided appropriate policies and firm 
strategies are in place.'. Also, 'under certain conditions, international linkages can 
compensate for initially weak domestic linkages' (ibid., p. 32). However, there is nothing 
automatic about the coupling of domestic and foreign networks. Constraints to the 
knowledge flow and knowledge generation within international production networks can 
be due to a variety of firm factors as well as other factors related to the role of the state or 
features of the market. 
The concerns of the economic and business literature with industrial networks are 
greatly focused on modes of entry (full ownership vs. arm's length relationships vs. 
alliances). The basic perspective is on transaction costs and the theory looks at the MNC 
as one of several possible ways of organising economic activity and explains why and when 
this particular form will be chosen in preference to its various alternatives. The dominant 
explanation is the OLI-framework or Eclectic Paradigm of International Production 
(Dunning, 1993), which explains MNCs as having a specific competitive advantage (O) 
that is better leveraged internally (I) by physically setting up a number of assets in the host 
country (L). Within this framework alliances are interpreted as cases of incomplete 
internalisation. MNC are interpreted as economic institutions that internalise the non-
pecuniary externalities resulting from 'natural' market imperfections. The basic issue within 
this perspective is to understand when the markets for intermediate inputs will be subject 
to such high transaction costs that hierarchical co-ordination becomes more efficient than 
the market. 
By focusing on markets and hierarchies as the fundamental modes of organisation, 
transaction cost analysts often do not consider the diversity of organisational arrangements 
that are contained within the alliances. By focusing on given transactions, transaction 
analysis overlooks the dynamic interaction between organisations and transactions and the 
way in which established organisations can develop new additional transactions (Meyer, 9 
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1998). The importance of  social networks in which alliances operate provides a much 
richer explanatory framework for understanding their growth and strategic management 
issues (Gulati, 1998)  
The link between international industrial networks and growth has been dealt with 
only partly with relation to FDI. (See Vernon, 1966, Ozawa, 1992, Dunning and Narula, 
1996,  Narula, 1996). The problem with these explanations is the limited number of 
explanatory variables, especially neglect of political variables and variety of country and 
sector specific factors. The complexity of variables to be involved in the framework can 
explain in part why the issue of global industrial trade and production networks and their 
linkages to growth and industrial upgrading lacks a coherent theory and is relatively under-
researched
3. This latter relates to both aspects of the problem: industrial upgrading as well 
as international linkages to the national innovation systems. An important weakness of 
innovation system theory is a neglect of the international dimension (Ernst, 1999, p. 2).  
The weakness in national systems of innovation literature is the actual elaboration of how 
international industrial networks matter for the process of national industrial upgrading and 
also, which variables matter in this process of interaction. Equally, the notion of industrial 
upgrading itself, which goes beyond R&D in explaining industrial progress, remains vague
4.  
It is usually assumed that when integration takes place at the production level via 
the establishment of subsidiaries and link-ups through joint ventures, this will 
automatically bring some degree of integration at the technological level. This is not 
necessarily the case. The EU and CEE are full of individual instances where production 
integration is not followed by technological integration and it is one of the key issues in the 
cohesion debate.  
From an international industrial networks perspective the industrial upgrading 
framework focuses on the relative position of firms or countries in international trade or 
supply networks. If we are to apply this framework to the CEE we must first resolve the 
empirical problem of which positions in international production chains producers from 
CEE occupy and how can these positions be explained. Only then can  we attempt to 
                                                                   
3 For modeling FDI backward and forward linkages through which domestic firms overtakes and forces out 
FDI plants see Markusen and Venables (1997).  
4 Gereffi (1999) defines industrial upgrading as 'a process of improving the ability of a firm or an economy to 
move to more profitable and/ or technologically sophisticated capital and skill-intensive economic niches.' (p. 51, 
52). 10 
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understand the dynamics of these networks. Being plugged into the global production 
network and having access to world markets does not by itself guarantee that 'dynamic 
learning' capability is acquired
5. Enterprises may remain in the same technological positions 
within production networks because the structural barriers against moving upward are too 
high to overcome. This suggests that the learning process through international production 
networks is not a continuous but is a discontinuous process. In technology 'catching up' 
enterprises have to pass through several distinct phases, each with specific learning and 
capability requirements.  
Here we will point to two issues important for explaining the growth aspects of 
'East' - 'West' industrial networks. First, do opportunities and requirements for growth of 
CEECs based on trade and international industrial networks depend on the position in 
global or regional production networks to which domestic enterprises belong? Are 
technology transfer and growth opportunities determined by the 'club' or network to which 
the enterprise is attached? For example, are opportunities for moving up the ladder of 
technological complexity the same for a central European component manufacturer when 
supplying Daewoo or Ford? 
Second, how can domestic enterprises move from lower to higher value-added 
positions within production networks? For a domestic economy a higher value-added 
position should, in principle, ensure more spillovers and more technology inflows as well as 
more opportunities for domestic clustering.  
Understanding the nature of production networks in CEE should tell us more about 
their dynamic potential. The discussion and research on this has already started. For 
example, Ellingstadt (1997) argues that we are witnessing the emergence of technologically 
stagnant 'East' - 'West' networks which resemble maquilladora types of relationships. Along 
this line is also the thinking that CEE will be a case of 'dependent national capitalism, 
integrated into the capitalist world economy on the now standard liberal lines, yielding a 
tolerable living standard for most of their citizens, but with the permanent high 
unemployment and inequalities typical of the semi-periphery' (Radice, 1995, p. 307). In 
                                                                   
5 By this we understand learning through continuous market and technology access which puts a firm on the path 
of technology accumulation and enables its 'catching-up' or 'forging ahead'. This is in contrast to the one-off 
import of technology and subsequent learning behind the protective barrier. The experience of developing 
countries suggests that the learning behind the barrier is inferior in a dynamic sense to learning which is linked to 
continuous access to foreign markets (Radosevic, 1999). 11 
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this version of the story CEE can operate only as a low cost skilled labour base with 
limited possibilities for technological integration. 
In the alternative story CEE could operate as a complement to Western 
production. As an argument in this direction Zysman and Schwartz (1998, p. 15) point to 
the example of German firms, which are drawing on the low cost skilled labour but to 
develop 'distinctive complementary, production'.  
The testing of these two propositions requires far more empirical research. This is 
even more true as determinants of CEE as a location cannot be reduced on either market 
access or cost reductions. International production involves a much more complex agenda 
where market access and cost reduction have to be reconciled with requirements such as 
operational flexibility, services, delivery, quality and technology.  
However, even when we get a rough picture of the factors behind the individual 
positions of CEE industries in international production networks we may miss the most 
important aspect of the problem: the dynamic potential of the initial positions and factors 
that influence industrial upgrading. Factors behind static efficiency requirements in 
resources allocation (cf. make or buy framework) tell us little about the dynamic 
requirements of learning and innovation. 
The second issue is concerned with mechanisms of interactive learning or diffusion 
of knowledge from foreign affiliates or domestic companies, which are plugged into 
international sourcing networks, to other domestic companies. Dynamic effects for the 
economy are stronger when related domestic suppliers or buyers are involved. The 
integration of sectoral technological flows with individual production capability comes 
from the clustering of firms and network externalities. Globalization may weaken this 
integration through different forms of 'enclaves' (maquilla, export processing zones, 
subsidiaries highly isolated from the host economy) unrelated to domestic sectors. The gain 
of world market share through 'enclaves' is not necessarily related to an improvement in 
productivity or a structural change in the pattern of industrialisation
6. Finally, if the 
Canadian experience can be of relevance to CEE, then it shows that the positions within 
international production chains are changing mainly due to the capabilities of local 
subsidiaries. On the sample of Canadian world product mandates, whereby mandates are 
                                                                   
6 For example, the Mexican maquilla specialisation has not been followed by changes in either the development of 
production capacity or technological capabilities (Capdeville et al., 1995). 12 
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defined as any subsidiary responsibility that extends beyond its own market, Birkinshaw 
(1996) and Birkinshaw and Morrison (1995) come up with several important conclusions. 
First, mandates are usually earned not given. Second, mandate development is 
fundamentally subsidiary driven. Third, responsibility over several production or business 
management functions gives a subsidiary more control over its destiny than managing a 
single function. Fourth, the sustainability of mandates depends on the strength of a firm 
and country specific advantages. 
This brief overview of the conceptual understanding of the linkages between 
industrial upgrading and international industrial networks shows that we cannot offer much 
in terms of comprehensive conceptual framework
7. However, relevant concepts and 
theories can illuminate different aspects of industrial networks. 
 
4. Networks and their alignment: framework for research 
 
The approach that takes into account the diversity of factors that shape industrial 
integration of the wider Europe should be based on the following three basic assumptions.  
 
Industrial organization and political economy perspectives merged 
The internationalization of production networks cannot be explained through an 
economics or business economics perspective only. The understanding of alliances and 
more broadly of industrial networks cannot be framed within the purely economist 'make 
or buy' framework which is rooted in the transaction cost perspective
8. Variables that might 
be considered 'political', in the broadest sense of the term, must be taken into account. 
These variables include institutions, whether economic or political, systems of innovation, 
different political and corporate governance regimes, and socio-political coalitions (Hall, 
1997). 
The classical choice posed in the literature is between arranging to produce some 
good or service 'in house' or acquiring it elsewhere through the market. An increasingly 
                                                                   
7 For example, Caves (1996) concludes that 'the relationship between a LDC's stock of foreign investment 
and its subsequent economic growth is a matter on which we totally lack trustworthy conclusions' (p. 237). 
8 See Kay (1991) for the critique of this perspective in the case of MNCs. 13 
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common  third option is to enter an alliance or network. From an economic perspective 
these choices are seen as being based on cost efficiency criteria. MNCs are very rarely seen 
as agents with market power whose expansion can be explained by collusion or monopoly 
power (Hymer, 1972). MNC are seen as organizations that take country factors as given 
and try to internalise specific locational advantages or avoid locational disadvantages. The 
mainstream interpretation of FDI  is an internalisation framework which is based on a 
transaction costs theory. As Dunning (1991) argues, internalization theory is a leading 
explanation of why a firm should engage in FDI rather than the  market. However, it 
cannot explain the level, structure and location of international production as claimed. If 
we are to understand the emerging industrial architecture of the wider Europe then the 
internalisation framework with its 'make or buy' dichotomy is far from sufficient to explain 
country and sectoral differences in the extent and structure of industrial networks. Even 
when an internalisation framework can illuminate the choices between make or buy it 
cannot say much about the growth of a particular firm or a group of firms (Cantwell, 1991). 
Growth of the firm is to a great extent a result of internally generated growth associated 
with firm specific advantages. Nevertheless, within a Coasian or transaction costs 
framework ownership- or firm-specific advantages are not essential. Firms basically adjust 
to external conditions and are not able themselves to shape the modes of entry. However, 
empirical research along a resources-based view suggests that they are actively shaping 
their industry environment. This is indeed the case in central European industries after 
entry of large investors which changes the nature of competition in the sector. 
All this points to the insufficiency of a 'make or buy' framework to understand the 
changing emerging international industrial networks in CEE. As pointed  out by Kim and 
von Tunzelmann, (1998, p. 4) '(t)he "make or buy" decision may however be amalgamated 
with the political governance perspective, and the decision seen as one that may take place 
variously in firms, networks or countries'.  The variety of 'make or buy' decisions will be 
seen not as shaped only through OLI (ownership - location - internalisation) variables but 
also by a broader set of political variables. The point is that MNE networks will not be 
determined only by make or buy decisions of foreign enterprises but will be formed in 
interaction with a larger set of external variables in the host country and the world market. 
This effectively means that the perspective of industrial organisation will have to be 
merged with the political economy perspective. 14 
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Multi-level factors which shape industrial networks 
 
The inclusion of political variables into the analytical framework inevitably brings 
the inclusion of different levels of analysis. In a review of different theoretical approaches 
to FDI and MNCs, Cantwell (1991) concluded that these approaches address different 
questions and levels of analysis even though by addressing different aspects of the problem 
market power, internalisation, macro and business administration perspectives pretend to 
be comprehensive. 
We do not have a specific or comprehensive view regarding the factors that shape 
industrial networks. These factors are very likely not an exhaustive list. In this respect we 
implicitly accept a contingency-based view of alliances or industrial networks by Lorange 
and Roos (1992). This assumes that no particular type of network is better, nor universally 
more correct, than another (Britto, 1998). The choice of networks is dependent on the 
particular conditions at hand. Furthermore, unlike the international business literature, 
which finds contingency considerations only within the set of strategic features related to 
partner firms, we propose the framework in which variables that influence the formation of 
networks are broader in scope and relate to CEE state actions, sectoral features and EU 
policies. This need for the inclusion of different levels comes also from the proliferation of 
actors, which today influence the shaping of international production networks. 
As Strange (1996) argues very persuasively we live a in a world of diffused power. '(T)he 
power had shifted upward from weak states to stronger ones with global or regional reach 
beyond their frontiers, that power had shifted sideways from states to markets and thus to 
non-state authorities deriving power from their market shares, and some power has 
'evaporated', in that no one was exercising it' (ibid., p. 189). In a similar view, Dunning 
(1997) argues that contemporary capitalism has changed towards alliance capitalism where 
the relationship between governments and MNCs has turned from becoming more 
cooperative and has become more interdependent. If this is so, then we have to take into 
account the actions of many more actors (MNCs, international organizations, national and 
local governments, NGOs) if we are to understand the patterns of the international 
production and knowledge linkages. Each of the levels (national, global, local or firm) 15 
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plays a role in the process of shaping of global industrial networks. For example, as pointed 
out earlier, country factors in CEE can explain functional types of FDI but not the extent, 
volume and structure of FDI (Lankes and Venables, 1997). The level of FDI is not 
explainable by country specific factors or at least not only by them. Since there is not a 
smooth functional relationship between levels of FDI and a country's progress in transition 
this suggests that sectoral, firm and other institutional variables play a role.  
The strategies of large firms may often be more decisive than country specific 
variables in shaping sectoral patterns of international production networks. As von 
Tunzelmann (1995: 10) points out 'by endogenously changing their circumstances through 
technological accumulation, firms may ultimately alter the national system itself.’ New 
systems of innovation in CEE will be strongly shaped by the way enterprises develop and 
integrate their business functions. This points to a need to involve an individual -firm level 
into analysis, especially in cases where large foreign investors can change the entire 
structure of the industry. 
The need for a multi-level analytical framework arises also from the nature of 
globalisation. 'Global' does not necessarily mean 'incorporating the whole world'. As 
Chesnais (1995, p. 85) put it: "'global markets' are exclusively markets where purchasing 
power and intermediate inputs are effectively located". This implies that the scope of 
'globality' is relative to each specific case. It differs across different dimensions: financial 
markets and competition are more globalized than production and sourcing networks. An 
industry can be global in the sense that industrial competition is global, i.e. a situation of 
'mutual global market dependence', but this does not imply that production, let alone 
technology, in that industry is globalized. 
 
Alignment of various networks 
 
The formation of industrial networks is seen as an alignment of various networks. 
Ernst (1999) points to 'co-evolution of international and domestic knowledge linkages that 
explains Korea's extraordinary success in information industries' (p. 32). Kim and von 
Tunzelmann (1998) point to the alignment of networks as an explanation for the 
Taiwanese success in IT. Network alignment comes as a result of effective coupling 16 
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between the evolution of national specific systems and the global (regional) production 
networks. The issue is not only 'the question of developing networks but of integrating 
locally and nationally emerging networks with global network structures' (Kim and 
Tunzelmann, 1998, p. 1). In particular, we want to examine the ways in which markets, 
firms, CEE states and EU actions can bring about the 'alignment' of these networks. 
A variety or multiplicity of networks is what drives the process of integrating CEE 
into global production systems.  By plugging themselves into global supply networks 
domestic firms externalise its disadvantages in accessing markets, technology and finance 
by surrendering control to foreign owners. Foreign investors then operate as compensatory 
mechanisms for weakened domestic firms. Weak national networks are likely to have small 
growth potential if not aligned to foreign networks.  
 However, whether an alignment of networks will take place depends not only on 
their linkages but also on the nature of each individual network. For example, robust 
industrial networks have developed political governance and corporate governance that 
match each other, which is not the case in CEE. For example, an overview of corporate 
governance in the Former Soviet Union by Estrin and Wright (1999) shows that slow 
progress in transition arises from weaknesses in implementing effective corporate 
governance as well as from weaknesses in the broader economic environment (capital 
markets; banks; product markets). In this case, weakness of national industrial networks 
hampers their alignment with global networks.  
The more national and local networks are developed the more sustainable will be 
their alignment with foreign firms and networks. Following Kim and von Tunzelmann 
(1998) the analytical framework should have all three dimensions — global, national and 
local networks - as well as their interactions. The major problem is methodological - how 
to systematically combine and integrate research on all three networks. A mechanical 
combination of sector, country and micro studies may not be sufficient.  
 
4.1. Network actors and linkages 
 
From a business studies perspective the problem of global production networks is 
dominantly seen as an issue of firms' strategies and the role of co-operative alliances (see, 17 
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for example, Dussauge and Garrette, 1999).  Indeed, corporate behaviour and strategies are 
essential for understanding the dynamics of production networks. However, if we are to 
understand the role that networks play in growth than  we cannot abstract from the wider 
relations in which corporate decisions are taken. Earlier we pointed out that we are 
sceptical about the explanations and analysis of industrial networks that are reduced on 
one level only, be it sectoral, country or firm-level. The issues of state strategies, especially 
privatisation, and EU policies, should be taken into account if we are to understand the 
extent and patterns of these networks. 
To understand the transformation of industrial networks in CEE and their 
realignment with global networks requires also an understanding of who the main potential 
or actual network organisers are. Different - national, sectoral, market and firm - 
determinants of the emerging networks are, by themselves, only a conditional advantage 
which requires network organisers to be turned into a real advantages. The question is who 
are the potential network organisers that could undertake the task of organising cross 
national production networks.  
Foreign multinationals often act as focal points within networks as the key actor 
controlling and directing other players.  On other occasions, a domestic player may emerge 
in that role.  Sometimes, it is a combination of the two.  Where foreign firms take the lead 
role, there are often immediate advantages in terms of finance and access to technology, 
but these may be offset by limited long-term growth potential - the lack of endogenous 
R&D, for example, and clear limitations imposed by implicit market sharing with existing 
European operations.  Domestic led modernization may be slower but promotes the 
development of indigenous capabilities, which grow 'from within' and are, therefore. deeply 
implanted into the process.  However, lack of finance and difficulties in accessing state-of-
the-art technical skills (which have to be learned from foreign firms) make such a process 
hazardous and explain why the modernization process often ends up being led by a 
combinations of foreign and domestic players. A review of industry studies in six sectors of 
CEE suggests that the incidence of foreign-led modernization is much more frequent in 
central Europe than in Russia and eastern Europe (Rumania, Bulgaria) (Radosevic, 1999b).  
In a different context but with similar concerns, this issues has been addressed 
through the notion of lead firms. Rugman (1997) points out that the lead company is at the 
heart of network. 'It … provides ... strategic and organizational leadership ... beyond the 18 
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resources that, from an accounting perspective, lie directly under … (its) … management 
control' (ibid, p.182)(my emphasis). The strategy of the lead company thus directly affects 
the competitive position of other network participants. Ernst (1999, p. 15, 16) points out 
that '(t)he lead company derives its strength from its control over critical resources and 
capabilities, and from its capacity to coordinate transaction between different network 
nodes. Both are the sources of its superior capacity for generating economic rents. Growth 
and strategic direction of suppliers is heavily determined by the lead firm'.  
Similar to our concerns regarding the CEE, Gereffi (1999) points to the key 
question of who will be the main 'organizing agents' in modernizing commodity chains in 
Mexico due to NAFTA
9.  
Network restructuring is strongly dependent on the (non)existence of a network 
organiser. At the core of this is the problem of co-ordination and complexity of production 
networks. For example, it is mainly the simple production networks, i.e. woodworking, the 
garment industry, or bulk commodities, that are re-orienting themselves relatively easily to 
world markets. In foreign trade this shift is present through the strong rise of labour-
intensive, supplier dominated and commodities based sectors (see Landesmann, 1997; 
Guerrieri, 1999; Guerrieri, 1999b; Kubielas, 1999).
10 Elsewhere (Radosevic, 1999c) we 
argue that the prospects for rebuilding the economies of the CEE are not only conditioned 
by (dis)economies in production but also can result from the inability of actors in 
production networks to self-organise due to institutional uncertainty and co-ordination 
failures, which hinder the self-organisation of industry.
11 This process results in the 
emergence or non-emergence of network organisers - organisations that act as promoters of 
trade, production and/or innovation linkages. 
Who is likely to be a network organiser in the post-socialist context? Limited and 
unsystematic evidence shows that there is a wide diversity of network organisers. Network 
                                                                   
9 Gerrefi (1999) defines organizing agent as 'those firms, foreign and domestic that could enhance the 
competitiveness of the apparel commodity chains in Mexico through backward or forward linkages with major 
producers and retailers. (p. 67). The lead firms in manufacture centered and retailer centered networks in the North 
American apparel commodity chains are in a position to play a direct role in upgrading Mexican domestic industry, 
(Gereffi, 1999, p. 68). He predicts that 'sourcing intermediaries will emerge in Mexico to perform the same kind 
'full package' services that trading companies and integrated manufacturers provided in 'East' Asia. (ibid., p. 68). 
10 For evidence in the case of Baltic economies see Radosevic, 1997b. 
11The difficulty with the empirical testing of this argument is that in real life self-organisation ability may not be 
the only constraint; the state of demand, domestic and foreign may also be an influence. Also, strong import 
competition or export restrictions from EU in 'sensitive sectors' like agriculture may hinder self-organisation of 
industry. 19 
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organisers are any actors with the necessary capability and resources - a user or supplier 
firm, a bank, a holding company or a financial - industrial group, a foreign trade 
organisation, a design institute, a foreign firm or, in some cases, even the state. Given the 
management, finance and technology gaps in CEE described in Radosevic (1999b)  it is 
foreign companies that, for the time being, seem to be the most active network organisers 
in CEE. 
However, network restructuring is not the result of the activities of foreign 
investors alone. As Tulder (1998, p. 36) shows in the case of car industry in CEE a tiered 
structure of countries developed in the region is triggered by an interaction of firm 
strategies and government policies - mediated by trade and industrial policies (Tulder, 
1998, p. 36). In some cases, for instance the case of Hungarian Suzuki, this has led to a 
situation where network alignment is very weak and which we would better define as a 
network failure (Swain, 1998).  
5. Conclusions 
With the reintegration of CEECs into the wider European economy, the European 
economy has become much more diverse and varied in terms of production and technology 
structures. Also, the process of EU enlargement is taking place at a time when trade 
patterns are being strongly shaped by the complex integration strategies of MNCs involving 
the construction of international production networks across national boundaries. This 
brings together issues relating to trade policy, foreign direct investment (FDI) and other 
forms of linkage in the production and technology field. The chapter discussed the role of 
'East' - 'West' industrial networks in reinforcing the competitive advantages of the EU and 
CEECs. However, we also accepted that there is nothing inevitably positive to come out 
of the process of industrial integration and that the integration could also lead to the 
erosion of  the national or even regional bases of competitiveness. This raises as an issue 
what are requirements for a 'win - win' situation. 
The national systems of innovation literature shows that the roots of technological 
competitiveness remain distinctly national (Lundvall 1992; Nelson 1993). What we may 
expect to see over the next period, therefore, is a new emerging European economic 
architecture which will be shaped by a multiplicity of corporate linkages and the interaction 
of corporate and national competitive strategies.  20 
 
  20  20 
This requires a better understanding of the modes and patterns of production and 
technology integration of CEECs into the wider European economy. Although market 
integration is a necessary objective of enlargement, it is in no way a sufficient condition for 
dynamically efficient outcomes in an enlarged EU. Convergence of CEECs in terms of 
growth is much more likely if market integration ('shallow integration') between the 
existing EU and the CEECs is reinforced by production and technology integration ('deep 
integration'). Otherwise, CEECs could end up politically integrated into the EU, but 
isolated and marginalised in terms of production and technology linkages and excessively 
dependent on budgetary transfers.  
Given that the specificity of European integration is 'deep' institutional integration 
the issue of its links with industrial integration warrant more attention. A proper 
understanding of the conditions for deep integration demands a better understanding of 
supply-side phenomena, in particular of the extent, factors, and nature of production and 
technology linkages between the existing EU and the CEECs. In section 4 we developed a 
perspective that can resolve some of the 'blank spots' indicated.  
We examined how best to understand the role of global industrial networks in CEE 
and the way they are contributing to growth in the region and in the EU and to industrial 
upgrading, in particular. Our conclusion is that if we want to understand the emerging 
industrial architecture of the wider Europe then industrial organization perspectives will 
have to merge with political economy perspectives. Different theoretical approaches to 
FDI, among which the 'make or buy' perspective is dominant, are separated from political 
economy approaches. We pointed to the basic assumptions for this integration and 
discussed framework  for such research. 
The basic difficulty with an integrated political economy - industrial organization 
perspective is to define which variables should be taken into account (Hall, 1997). Our 
unit of analysis is industrial dynamics which is by itself an open system. As Lundvall 
(1998) points out '(I)industrial dynamics is not linked to one specific level of aggregation in 
terms of micro-, meso-, and macro-analysis_.(b)ut presents a specific perspective on the 
firm as an open system that is affected by and affects wider systems'.(p.2-3 cited in Ernst, 
1998). Alongside the multi-level nature of the problem an additional issues is multi-
dimensionality. The intersection between different networks is either nationally or 
sectorally specific and involves a variety of the governance factors that hinder or enable 21 
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alignment of different networks. In section 4.1. we adopted Kim and von Tunzelmann's 
(1998) framework for analysing the (mis)alignment of networks.  However, this does not 
solve the problem of the nature and quality of networks that (mis)align. Differences in  
types and qualities of national, global and local networks influence how this alignment will 
take place. In the CEE context, even when governments are not able to fully enforce 
property rights, this alignment does take place, although with important effects on the way 
CEE becomes integrated into global networks
12.  An additional factor in these outcomes is 
the EU accession policy whose impact will become much stronger as the enlargement 
progresses. 
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